India is planning a more than ten-fold increase from current levels and is setting the stage for a transformative scale-up of nuclear infrastructure.

Nuclear energy in India, while a modest contributor to the overall power mix, stands at a pivotal juncture in its development trajectory. As of early 2025, the country operates 25 nuclear reactors across seven power stations, delivering a total installed capacity of approximately 8,880 MW, which accounts for roughly 2.3% of the nation’s total electricity capacity (NPCIL, 2025; CEA, 2024). In the fiscal year 2024-25, nuclear generation reached around 57 TWh, maintaining its share at about 3% of total power generation (CEA, 2025). This growth reflects a gradual expansion from an installed capacity of around 4,780 MW in 2014, marking a 71% rise over the past decade (DAE, 2015). Such progress underscores steady, if deliberate, advancements in India’s nuclear sector.

The last five years have seen notable capacity increases. From approximately 6.8 GW in mid-2020, nuclear capacity has grown to 8.8 GW by mid-2025, a 30% increase over that period (NPCIL, 2025). However, when set against the broader power landscape—with renewables surging, though nuclear still supplies nearly double its capacity share in generation (3% vs 2.3%)—it becomes clear that nuclear, while reliable, remains a relatively minor contributor.

A closer look at India’s reactor fleet reveals the backbone of its nuclear programme. The majority of this installed capacity comes from domestically designed Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), exemplified by installations at sites such as Kakrapar, Rawatbhata, Kaiga, and others (IAEA, 2024). Notably, the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station Units 3 and 4, both Indian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (IPHWR-700) designs, represent recent milestones: Unit 3 achieved first criticality in July 2020, reached grid connection in January 2021, and was declared in full commercial operation by June 2023 (PIB, 2023); Unit 4 followed, with criticality in December 2023 and commercial operation by March 2024 (PIB, 2024).

Complementing PHWR-based growth, India is advancing its closed fuel cycle philosophy through the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam. In 2024, PFBR crossed milestones, including sodium system readiness, and authorization for fuel loading was granted 2024 (DAE, 2024). This operational leap forward in the country’s three-stage nuclear development strategy aims to harness India’s abundant thorium reserves while building self-reliance in nuclear fuel production.

As for cost and installation challenges, nuclear remains more resource-intensive compared to other clean technologies. Studies suggest that nuclear power is significantly more expensive than solar in India—roughly two to three times higher in levelized costs—and can take 5–7 years to build, whereas solar projects typically complete in under a year (CAG, 2022; CEA, 2023). This complexity, longer timelines, and higher upfront investment underscore nuclear’s strategic—but slower—role in energy planning.

Regulatory oversight is anchored firmly in the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), established under the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 and functioning since 1985. Headquartered in Mumbai, AERB ensures stringent safety through multi-tier oversight mechanisms, licensing processes, and specialized committees such as SARCOP (Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants), SARCAR, and ACPSRs (AERB, 2023). In this context, nuclear facilities in India are designed with a “Defence-in-Depth” philosophy, adhere to the “As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)” principle for radiation exposure, and maintain readiness for emergencies—reaffirming India’s robust safety approach.

Management of radioactive waste is carefully governed by AERB guidelines under the Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987, and relevant AERB safety codes. Most nuclear power plant sites employ near-surface disposal facilities (NSDF) for solid radioactive waste. For example, at Kudankulam, waste is stored in engineered modules within the facility. Ongoing environmental monitoring by Environmental Survey Laboratories (ESLs) of BARC confirms radiation levels remain well below permissible limits (BARC, 2023).

Looking ahead, India has set ambitious expansion targets. By 2031–32, the government plans to elevate nuclear capacity to 22,480 MW, with 10 reactors (totaling about 8 GW) under construction across states like Gujarat, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh, alongside 10 additional reactors in pre-project stages (PIB, 2024). As of April 2025, about 6.6 GW was under construction, and around 7 GW was in the planning pipeline, pointing toward a near-term capacity of ~23.5 GW (CEA, 2025).

The long-term vision is even more profound: reaching 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047, aligning with India’s “Viksit Bharat” aspiration and net-zero commitments (DAE, 2023). This would represent a more than tenfold increase from current levels and set the stage for a transformative scale-up of nuclear infrastructure.

To make this transition feasible, India is advancing structural reforms and innovative technologies. Recent government policy discussions have introduced the Nuclear Energy Mission, with proposals to fund Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs)—220 MW PHWRs optimized for reduced land use, suitable for captive industrial power applications. Parallel efforts focus on developing Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and advanced designs like high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and molten salt reactors, all aimed at leveraging domestic thorium potential and enhancing deployment flexibility (DAE, 2024).

Crucially, India is also considering reforms to its nuclear investment framework. Proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act (1962) and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) are under discussion to facilitate greater private and foreign participation in the sector. Proposals suggest permitting up to 49% foreign equity in nuclear power projects, subject to government approval. Leading domestic players such as Reliance, Tata Power, Adani, and Vedanta have expressed investment interest, while international technology partners—including Westinghouse, GE-Hitachi, EDF, and Rosatom—are being courted. In parallel, NTPC is negotiating with global entities (including those from Russia and the U.S.) to develop SMR-based projects, while the 2.8 GW Mahi Banswara project in Rajasthan has been approved and awaits construction start, likely within the next couple of years (NTPC, 2024; DAE, 2024). These developments illustrate a shift toward diversified capital and technology models to accelerate growth.

Despite these bold plans, the nuclear sector faces challenges that cannot be overlooked. The expansion has historically been slow: of the 36 GW planned, only around 7 GW is currently under construction (CEA, 2025). Legal hurdles—especially liability norms in the 2010 Act—have deterred suppliers and investors, dissuading participation due to perceived risks of unlimited liability in accident scenarios (IAEA, 2023). Moreover, public resistance, particularly around sites like Jaitapur and Kudankulam, has posed social acceptance challenges, leading to protests and legal interventions (World Nuclear Industry Status Report, 2024).

In synthesizing India’s nuclear energy narrative, a few core themes emerge. 

• First, the steady but incremental growth in capacity and generation over the past decade underscores continuity in India’s nuclear ambitions.
• Second, the country’s indigenous reactor design and closed fuel-cycle approach remain central, showcasing technological self-reliance.
• Third, the regulatory and safety framework—anchored by AERB—is robust, emphasizing structured oversight, safety culture, and waste management controls. 
• Fourth, nuclear expansion faces systemic constraints in cost, timelines, liability norms, and social acceptance. Fifth, transformational goals (100 GW by 2047) hinge on strategic enablers: BSRs/SMRs, legislative reform, private/foreign sector engagement, and project acceleration. 

Lastly, while nuclear is slower and costlier than solar or wind, it offers baseload, low-carbon power—a vital complement to renewables (CEA, 2025; IAEA, 2024).

In conclusion, India’s nuclear energy programme is at an inflection point. With foundational infrastructure and expertise already in place, the country now must navigate complex policy reforms, catalyze private participation, and deploy advanced reactor technologies—all while ensuring societal acceptance and financial viability. If these elements align, India may well scale its nuclear segment from a modest 3% today to a significant pillar of its clean energy future by 2047.

This Post was submitted by India Country Manager, Ankita A. Padelkar.