China: What Recent Climate Polling Tells Us

The findings indicate a generally high level of public awareness and strong support for climate action and national carbon neutrality goals.

This report synthesizes recent polling data to provide a comprehensive understanding of public opinion in China regarding climate change policies and programs. The findings indicate a generally high level of public awareness and strong support for climate action and national carbon neutrality goals. The Chinese public also demonstrates a notable willingness to engage in pro-climate behaviors and embrace renewable energy. Support and awareness, however, vary significantly across demographic groups, with urban, educated, and higher-income populations typically exhibiting greater engagement. The public largely favors government-led initiatives and shows strong support for market-based mechanisms, such as carbon pricing, alongside specific programs in green buildings and electric vehicles. It is crucial to interpret these findings within the context of inherent challenges in Chinese public opinion polling, including sampling difficulties and potential self-censorship, which may influence reported support levels. These insights provide valuable guidance for climate non-profits, informing the development of tailored communication strategies, advocacy efforts, and programs to engage the Chinese public and support national climate ambitions effectively.

1. Introduction: China’s Climate Ambitions and the Role of Public Opinion

China, as the world’s largest annual emitter, has publicly committed to ambitious climate targets: striving to peak carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.1 These goals form the foundation of China’s climate strategy. They are deeply integrated into its national development plans, exemplified by the “1+N” policy system.1 The nation has demonstrated remarkable progress in renewable energy deployment, notably surpassing its 2030 wind and solar capacity targets six years ahead of schedule, reaching 1,400 GW in 2024.7 This rapid expansion positions China as a global leader in clean energy investment.8

Despite this aggressive push for renewables, a significant challenge persists: coal remains the dominant source of power, accounting for over 60% of electricity generation in 2024, with new coal power plants continuing to be built at a large scale.1 This creates a conflicting dynamic between rapid renewable growth and persistent reliance on fossil fuels. The simultaneous pursuit of aggressive renewable energy deployment and continued coal expansion suggests a complex and multifaceted energy transition strategy. This approach is likely driven by a dual imperative: achieving climate goals while also ensuring energy security and economic stability for a rapidly growing economy. The construction of coal plants, for instance, is often supported by regional stimulus and framed as a means to enhance grid flexibility.7 Furthermore, China’s substantial investments in renewables are partly motivated by concerns over the security of its imported energy supply and its rapidly growing energy demand.9 Public support for climate policies, particularly for renewable energy, could be a crucial factor in navigating this internal tension, potentially enabling a faster coal phase-down by reducing political and social resistance to the necessary systemic changes.

Public opinion is increasingly recognized as a vital component for mobilizing individual pro-climate behaviors, influencing consumer choices, and fostering broader societal engagement.3 Surveys indicate that strong “bottom-up support” from the Chinese public for climate action can provide a firm basis for governmental action on climate change, both domestically and internationally, adding confidence that China can achieve its ambitious targets.2 In China’s authoritarian context, high public support for climate action, even if partially influenced by official narratives, acts less as a direct driver of policy formation (as seen in democratic systems) and more as a powerful enabler of policy execution and public compliance. If the public is highly supportive of climate goals, it reduces the likelihood of widespread resistance or non-compliance with new regulations or lifestyle changes. The government can leverage this perceived public mandate to demonstrate both domestic legitimacy and international commitment. For a climate non-profit, this means that fostering public awareness and engagement, even in a top-down system, is not futile; it can strengthen the government’s hand in pursuing more aggressive climate action.

2. Overall Public Support for Climate Action in China

The Chinese public demonstrates a high level of awareness and belief in climate change. A significant majority, over 90%, believe that climate change is happening.2 More than half of the population (55%) understands that climate change is caused mostly by human activities, indicating a foundational understanding of its anthropogenic nature.2 Crucially, a substantial proportion (60-69%) report having personally experienced the effects of climate change.2 This direct experience contributes to a “very high awareness” level in China, as noted by researchers.2 The high reported personal experience of climate impacts, such as extreme weather events 12, likely serves as a powerful, tangible driver of public awareness and concern. This direct, lived experience can make climate change less abstract and more urgent than other environmental issues, such as general air pollution 14, potentially overriding potential skepticism or disinterest that might arise from abstract scientific discussions. While air pollution is often a daily, visible, and immediate health concern for many Chinese citizens, making it feel more urgent, the personal experience of extreme weather transforms climate change into a tangible, felt threat. This direct impact elevates climate change above other abstract environmental concerns like general conservation efforts in public perception, even if the daily immediacy of air quality still ranks higher in terms of “urgency.” This underscores that personal relevance is a key motivator for public engagement.

There is overwhelming public support for China’s ambitious “dual carbon targets.” A remarkable 97% of the Chinese public supports the goals of carbon emissions peaking before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.2 Furthermore, a significant 89% of respondents express confidence that China can achieve these challenging targets.2 Awareness of the carbon neutrality goal itself is also notable, with more than half (55%) of respondents indicating they had heard about it.3 The exceptionally high reported confidence in achieving ambitious climate targets suggests a strong belief in the government’s capacity and commitment to deliver on its promises. However, it also prompts consideration of how surveys are perceived in China, where respondents may align their answers with official narratives, viewing surveys as a form of “test”.15 This dual interpretation is critical for climate non-profits: Is this overwhelming support genuine public buy-in and active conviction, or is it partly a reflection of effective political messaging and a desire to conform to perceived state expectations? In an authoritarian system where citizens are routinely tested on state ideology and generally have high regime support, responses to questions about government policies might be influenced by a desire to provide the “correct” or officially sanctioned answer. This does not necessarily mean the support is disingenuous, but it implies that it might be more about aligning with state priorities than an independent, deeply held conviction. Understanding this nuance informs the depth and resilience of public support, as well as how non-profits might frame their communications, emphasizing alignment with shared national goals rather than challenging state narratives.

Table 1: Chinese Public Awareness and Beliefs on Climate Change (2022-2023 Data)

Metric	Percentage/Description	Source/Year
Belief climate change is happening	>90%	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Belief human activities are primary cause	55%	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Personal experience of climate effects	60-69%	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Awareness of carbon neutrality goal	55%	Tandfonline 2022 survey 3
Support for dual carbon targets (peak before 2030, neutrality before 2060)	97%	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Belief in achieving dual carbon targets	89%	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Willingness to learn more about climate solutions	Expressed desire	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Willingness to pay more for climate-friendly products	Expressed willingness	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2

3. Public Attitudes, Views, and Knowledge on Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development

The Chinese public expresses strong support for the transition to clean energy.2 Specifically, 94% of respondents state that China should increase its use of renewable energy.2 This public sentiment aligns with China’s actual rapid progress in renewable energy deployment, where renewables supplied 36% of power generation in Q1 2025 8, and the country leads globally in renewable investment and capacity additions.8 The exceptionally high public support for renewable energy, combined with China’s aggressive and visible deployment of renewable capacity, suggests a positive feedback loop. The government’s proactive, large-scale investments, combined with the tangible success of renewable projects (e.g., surpassing 2030 targets six years early), demonstrate its commitment and capability. This visible progress makes renewable energy appear to be a viable, effective, and beneficial path, thereby solidifying public support. This is a “build it and they will support it” dynamic, where the government’s actions legitimize and normalize the transition, fostering public acceptance. The government’s proactive and successful deployment of renewables directly fosters public acceptance and demand for more, creating a highly favorable environment for further decarbonization. For non-profits, this means highlighting the successes of renewable projects and their benefits can be a powerful communication tool to maintain and build public enthusiasm.

The Chinese public also demonstrates a willingness to adopt pro-climate behaviors and embrace green products. They express a desire to learn more about climate change solutions and how climate change relates to their daily lives.2 Significantly, they also indicate a willingness to pay more for climate-friendly products.2 Furthermore, survey findings suggest a strong willingness among respondents to partake in individual actions and agree that mitigating climate change should begin with changing individual behaviors and lifestyles.14 The expressed willingness to pay more for climate-friendly products and engage in individual actions suggests a nascent consumer-driven aspect to China’s climate efforts, moving beyond purely state-mandated changes. This indicates a potential for market-based solutions and private sector engagement, which could diversify climate action beyond heavy industry and government directives, fostering a more holistic approach to sustainability. This willingness implies a potential for demand-side influence on climate action. If consumers are willing to pay more for green products, it creates market incentives for businesses to innovate and produce such goods and services. This introduces a new dimension to climate action, where individual choices and market forces can complement government policy, rather than climate action being solely reliant on industrial mandates. This represents a significant development in a traditionally top-down economic system. Non-profits can explore consumer education campaigns, promote green consumption, and facilitate partnerships between consumers and businesses on sustainable products, leveraging this emerging public willingness to drive market transformation.

While specific polling data exclusively on “sustainable development” as a broad concept is less detailed than for climate change or renewable energy, the overarching public support for climate action, renewable energy adoption, and willingness to engage in green behaviors implicitly aligns with the principles of sustainable development. In related sectors, China’s agricultural policy objectives have diversified from solely increasing food production to also improving competitiveness and environmental performance 16, reflecting a broader governmental shift towards sustainable practices. The observed shift in agricultural policy objectives from pure production to integrating environmental performance, coupled with the general public’s willingness to pay for green products, indicates a broader societal acceptance and governmental recognition of environmental considerations being integrated into economic development. This suggests that “sustainable development” is increasingly understood as a holistic concept in China, encompassing not just climate mitigation but also broader environmental and economic sustainability. The diversification of agricultural policy away from a sole emphasis on production to include environmental performance, alongside the public’s stated willingness to pay for “climate-friendly products,” suggests a growing societal embrace of sustainability beyond just energy. It implies that “sustainable development” is becoming a more integrated concept in public and policy discourse, moving beyond just carbon emissions to encompass broader environmental and social considerations, such as sustainable land use and consumption patterns. This broader embrace of sustainability provides fertile ground for non-profits working on diverse environmental issues, as public receptiveness extends beyond just climate change to encompass related areas, such as green agriculture or eco-friendly consumption, opening new avenues for engagement.

4. Demographic and Socio-Political Dimensions of Climate Policy Support

Awareness and support for climate policies vary across different demographic groups in China. Higher levels of education (junior college and above) consistently correlate with higher awareness of the anthropogenic causes of climate change.14 Awareness of China’s carbon neutrality goal is also significantly and positively correlated with education level 3 Similarly, respondents with higher annual household incomes are more likely to be aware of the carbon neutrality goal.3 Awareness of the carbon neutrality goal also differs significantly by occupation: those working in government, universities, and research institutes, as well as students and those in business/self-employed sectors, exhibit higher awareness than the survey average, while retired/jobless/unemployed individuals and those working in agriculture show the lowest levels of awareness.3 In terms of gender, males are significantly more aware of the carbon neutrality goal and generally more concerned about climate change and its human causes compared to females.3 Regarding age, middle-aged respondents (between 35-44 and 45-54 years) are the most aware of the carbon neutrality goal, while the youngest (15-24) and oldest (65-74) age brackets show the lowest awareness.3 However, younger populations are generally more concerned about climate change than their older counterparts.14 Location also plays a role, with urban respondents demonstrating significantly higher awareness of the carbon neutrality goal than their rural counterparts.3 Urban populations are generally more concerned about climate change than rural populations, 14, and support for specific policies like carbon tax and cap-and-trade is notably higher among urban residents 14

This consistent pattern of higher awareness and concern among urban, educated, higher-income, and middle-aged male populations suggests that access to diverse information, higher levels of formal education (including scientific literacy), and direct exposure to urban environmental challenges (e.g., air pollution, which is often more severe in cities) are key determinants of climate awareness. For rural, lower-income, and less educated populations, immediate local environmental issues (e.g., water quality, soil degradation) or economic survival might take precedence, and access to climate-specific information might be limited or framed differently. This highlights a potential “awareness gap” that climate non-profits need to address in rural, less educated, and lower-income communities, where information access and daily priorities may differ. This implies that non-profits need to tailor their communication strategies to different demographic segments, developing accessible, locally relevant information for rural, lower-income, and less educated groups. This approach may involve directly linking climate change to their immediate concerns, such as health, agricultural stability, or local environmental quality.

The Chinese public overwhelmingly considers the government, particularly the central government, as the primary entity responsible for addressing climate change.3 This indicates a strong expectation for state leadership on major societal issues. There is general approval and improved satisfaction with the government’s climate actions, a trend that coincides with China’s increased green investments.14 This suggests that visible government action reinforces public trust. Respondents place high trust in scientific institutes (89%) and the government (86%) as reliable sources of information about climate change.11 This underscores the significant influence of official and scientific channels in shaping public understanding. This strong public expectation for government leadership and high trust in official sources indicates a “state-centric” view of climate governance in China. This means that public support is heavily mediated by perceived government efficacy and commitment, rather than being an independent, bottom-up demand. It also implies that official communication channels are highly influential in shaping public opinion and legitimizing climate policies. In a top-down governance system, the public’s default expectation is for the state to lead on major societal challenges. The high trust in government and scientific institutes (which are often state-affiliated or controlled) means that official narratives and policy pronouncements carry significant weight and are readily accepted. Public support for climate action is thus largely a function of their belief in the government’s capacity and willingness to act, rather than being expressed through independent advocacy or protest. This reinforces the idea that policy legitimacy flows from the top down, with public opinion acting as a reinforcing mechanism that enables, rather than dictates, policy. For non-profits, this suggests that direct challenges to government policy may be less effective than strategies focused on influencing government policy directly or demonstrating how their work aligns with and supports national climate goals and leveraging trusted institutions.

The reasons for varying stances often relate to the visibility of environmental issues. Chinese people are often more concerned about air pollution and other issues that visibly affect their daily lives than they are about climate change.14 However, climate change seems to resonate more than issues perceived as less human-centered, like general conservation.14 This suggests that direct, tangible impacts drive concern more than abstract global problems.14 The nuanced perception of climate change’s urgency relative to air pollution suggests that while general awareness is high, the immediacy of the climate threat is still largely perceived through the lens of local, visible impacts. Air pollution is a pervasive and daily health issue for many in China, making its urgency both immediate and tangible. While climate change impacts (such as extreme weather) are also personally experienced, they may not feel as constantly pressing as air quality issues. However, climate change is seen as more important than abstract “conservation” because its impacts are more directly perceived as affecting human well-being and development. This indicates a pragmatic public concern driven by direct human impacts and quality of life. This implies that effective climate communication needs to bridge the gap between global climate change and its tangible, local consequences, rather than relying solely on abstract scientific data or distant future predictions. Communication strategies should emphasize the direct, local impacts of climate change (e.g., health risks, food security, water scarcity, extreme weather events) and connect them explicitly to daily life, making the abstract global problem more concrete and urgent for the public.

Table 3: Demographic Variations in Climate Awareness and Support in China

Demographic Group	Awareness of Carbon Neutrality Goal	Support for Carbon Neutrality Goal	General Climate Concern/Awareness	Source/Year
Education Level	Higher education: significantly higher awareness; Master’s degree and above: highest awareness 3	High school education: average or higher support despite lower awareness 3	Higher education: consistently higher awareness of anthropogenic causes 14	Tandfonline 2022, PLOS Climate 2023 3
Income Level	High-income respondents: most likely to be aware 3	Not specified for support variation	Not specified for general concern variation	Tandfonline 2022 3
Occupation	Government, universities, research institutes, students, business/self-employed: higher awareness; Agriculture, retired/jobless/unemployed: lowest awareness 3	Agriculture workers: average or higher support despite lower awareness 3	Not specified for general concern variation	Tandfonline 2022 3
Gender	Males: significantly more aware 3	Females: average or higher support despite lower awareness 3	Males: more likely to agree with anthropogenic cause and generally more concerned; Females: less likely to agree and less concerned 14	Tandfonline 2022, PLOS Climate 2023 3
Age	Middle-aged (35-54): most aware; Youngest (15-24) & oldest (65-74): lowest awareness 3	Not specified for support variation	Younger populations: more concerned than older counterparts; Older group (46+): less concerned 14	Tandfonline 2022, PLOS Climate 2023 3
Location (Urban/Rural)	Urban: significantly higher awareness 3	Urban residents: especially high support for carbon tax and cap-and-trade 14	Urban: more concerned than rural; Rural: less concerned 14	Tandfonline 2022, PLOS Climate 2023 3

5. Preferred Climate Policies and Programs

Public opinion in China demonstrates significant support for carbon pricing mechanisms. Policy measures such as a carbon tax and cap-and-trade programs enjoy high public backing.14 Specifically, surveys indicate overwhelming support for a carbon tax (~68%) and slightly higher support for cap-and-trade programs (~73%).14 This support is particularly high among urban residents.14 Despite this public backing, China’s national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which covers 40% of the country’s CO2 emissions, has had a limited impact on reducing emissions so far. This is primarily attributed to an oversupply of allowances and the absence of a binding emissions cap.8 The high public support for carbon pricing mechanisms stands in contrast to the currently limited impact of the existing ETS due to its design flaws. This suggests a public appetite for market-based climate solutions that is not yet fully leveraged by policy implementation. The discrepancy implies that the public is ready for more robust market-based mechanisms. This indicates a potential for strengthening existing mechanisms, such as the ETS, as public backing appears to be genuinely high for such approaches. The current policy’s limitations are more about design and implementation than public opposition. Non-profits could advocate for policy reforms to strengthen the ETS, framing it as a measure that aligns with public preference for effective market-based climate solutions and enhances China’s climate ambition.

The Chinese public overwhelmingly expects the government to take the leading role in addressing climate change. More than 90% of respondents state that the government should take the lead in climate actions.3 This strong public expectation for government leadership reinforces the top-down nature of climate governance in China. It implies that public support is less about demanding specific policies from the ground up, and more about endorsing and enabling the government’s existing or planned climate agenda. This dynamic shapes how climate action is perceived and implemented within the country. While it might seem self-evident in China’s political system, the explicit high percentage reinforces that the public largely delegates responsibility for large-scale societal issues to the central government. Therefore, public support for climate action is primarily expressed as approval of government initiatives and trust in its capacity to deliver, rather than through independent advocacy or protest. This means that policy legitimacy flows from the top down, with public opinion acting as a reinforcing mechanism. For non-profits, this suggests that strategies focused on influencing government policy directly, or demonstrating how public sentiment aligns with government goals, might be more effective than attempting to build purely grassroots pressure for policy change.

Beyond broad policy frameworks, the public also shows support for individual actions and specific programs. Respondents generally show a strong willingness to partake in individual actions and agree that mitigating climate change should begin with changing individual behaviors and lifestyles.14 As previously highlighted, 94% of the public believes China should use more renewable energy.2

In the realm of green buildings, China is a global leader in environmentally friendly construction, a trend driven by a growing public demand for greener, healthier, and energy-smart edifices.18 This public demand is supported by local government incentives for green building certifications like LEED 18 and central government subsidy funds for energy conservation renovations of existing buildings.19 The growing public demand for “greener, healthier, and energy-smart edifices,” coupled with robust government incentives for green building, indicates a powerful convergence of public preference, market forces, and policy support towards sustainable urban development. This suggests that the public’s desire for improved living environments and health benefits is translating into demand for green infrastructure, creating a powerful synergy with broader climate goals. The “growing demand” for green buildings goes beyond abstract climate action; it taps into tangible benefits for daily life, such as improved health, comfort, and energy savings. This indicates that public preference for a better quality of life is aligning with climate goals. The government’s incentives are effectively leveraging this public desire, creating a virtuous cycle where public demand encourages policy, and policy enables more green development, further shaping public expectations for sustainable living environments. Non-profits can effectively promote climate action by emphasizing the direct, co-benefits of policies like green buildings, such as improved health and quality of life, to mobilize public support further.

China’s Electric Vehicle (EV) market is the largest in the world, characterized by overwhelming consumer appetite. An impressive 97% of China-based respondents indicate they are likely to consider an EV for their next vehicle purchase 20, a figure significantly higher than in Western countries. Chinese consumers also show a strong willingness to consider domestic EV models.20 This trend is supported by national targets aiming for 20% of new vehicle sales to be electric by 2025.1 The overwhelming consumer appetite for EVs in China, which far surpasses that in Western nations, suggests that factors beyond pure environmental concern are driving adoption. These include affordability (due to government subsidies, lower labor rates, and favorable battery costs), advanced technological features, and high consumer confidence in the rapidly expanding charging infrastructure.20 This demonstrates a highly successful integration of climate policy with industrial strategy and consumer preferences, creating a self-reinforcing market for clean transportation. The snippet explicitly lists the reasons for this extraordinary demand: “lower labour rates, increased scale, healthy government subsidies, and more favourable battery costs” contributing to affordability; “exterior and interior styling; components that enhance user experience; and advanced technology, including safety and connected-vehicle features” for appeal; and “confidence consumers have when it comes to how quickly and aggressively these challenges [charging infrastructure] are being addressed”.20 This indicates that the Chinese government’s industrial policy (subsidies, infrastructure development) has successfully aligned with consumer desires for cost-effective, tech-advanced, and convenient transportation. It is a prime example of how top-down policy can cultivate strong bottom-up demand when the incentives and infrastructure are effectively put in place. This success story for EVs can serve as a powerful model for other climate policies: combining strong government support and incentives with market-friendly approaches and directly addressing consumer pain points (like charging infrastructure). Non-profits can highlight this integrated approach as a best practice.

Regarding energy efficiency programs, the Chinese government provides various incentives and subsidy funds to promote improvements, particularly in existing buildings.19 While direct public polling on specific support for sustainable agriculture policies is less explicit in the provided material, government policies have diversified to include environmental performance alongside food production goals.16 Although direct public polling on sustainable agriculture is limited, the policy shift towards environmental performance in agriculture implies a top-down recognition of its importance. Given the broader public support for sustainable development and green products 2, it is reasonable to infer that sustainable agriculture, if framed correctly (e.g., in terms of healthier food, cleaner environment, or rural revitalization), would also garner public buy-in and support. The lack of specific polling data might simply reflect that it is a less visible or immediate concern for the average urban citizen compared to air quality or EVs. Non-profits could explore public education campaigns on the benefits of sustainable agriculture, linking it to broader public concerns like food safety and health, which are likely high priorities for Chinese citizens.

Table 2: Public Support for Key Climate Policies in China (Latest Available Data)

Policy/Program Type	Percentage of Public Support/Agreement	Source/Year
Support for Dual Carbon Targets (peak before 2030, neutrality before 2060)	97%	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Belief in Achieving Dual Carbon Targets	89%	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Support for More Renewable Energy Use	94%	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Support for Carbon Tax	~68%	PLOS Climate 2023 review of 2009/2016 surveys 14
Support for Cap-and-Trade Programs	~73%	PLOS Climate 2023 review of 2009/2016 surveys 14
Willingness to Pay for Climate-Friendly Products	Expressed willingness	China4C/YPCCC 2022 survey 2
Willingness to Take Individual Actions	Strong willingness	PLOS Climate 2023 review of 2009/2016 surveys 14
Likelihood to Consider EV for Next Purchase	97%	AlixPartners EV Survey 2024 20

6. Utility and Limitations of Climate-Related Polling in China

Conducting public opinion research in China presents unique challenges that influence the reliability and interpretation of climate-related polling data.

Challenges in Obtaining Reliable Representative Samples:

China’s immense geographic size, diverse ethnic groups, significant migrant population, and large rural population present inherent difficulties in obtaining truly representative samples for national surveys.13 The “golden age” of nationally representative face-to-face surveys using probability-based sampling, often with international collaboration, has become more challenging over the past decade. Researchers are increasingly relying on smaller projects that utilize internet-based non-probability samples.15 These online panels face several quality issues, including the participation of “opt-in” respondents who may be “professional survey takers” rushing through questions for compensation, and the increasing problem of bots submitting low-quality responses.15 Critically, online samples tend to skew towards urban, younger, and more educated individuals, and often include a disproportionately higher number of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members, leading to a significant lack of representativeness for the broader population.15 While statistical weighting can help adjust imperfect samples to known population characteristics, it cannot compensate for situations where entire groups of people (e.g., Tibetans or Uyghurs, or specific rural populations) are not represented at all in the initial sample.13 The systemic shift towards online, non-probability samples introduces a significant methodological bias that likely inflates reported climate awareness and support. This is because these samples disproportionately represent demographics (urban, educated, younger, and CCP members) that are already identified as having higher climate awareness and support.3 Consequently, the reported high levels of public support might represent an upper bound, not fully reflecting the attitudes of the broader, more diverse Chinese population, especially marginalized groups.13 When interpreting results, non-profits must apply a critical lens, acknowledging that actual nationwide support might be lower or more varied than reported, especially in rural or less privileged areas. This requires careful caveats in any public-facing communication derived from such polls.

Challenges in Obtaining Authentic Beliefs:

Some Chinese citizens may perceive surveys as a “test” with “right” and “wrong” answers, rather than as a means to elicit personal views. This behavior is influenced by the pervasive testing of CCP ideology in schools and a broader political tradition of “right thinking”.15 Experts caution against “naïve uses of Chinese survey data” due to political pressures and the tendency to guess the “standard” answer.15 The existence of a highly repressive authoritarian regime that closely monitors the population through digital and in-person surveillance can lead respondents to self-censor, provide inflated responses, or refuse to participate due to concerns about safety.15 Research indicates that certain question formats, particularly on sensitive political issues, elicit a defensive response, resulting in high non-response rates. This non-response is notably higher among marginalized individuals (women, lower social classes, less educated, rural residents, non-Party members, and older respondents).15 While climate change is not explicitly identified as a “sensitive political issue” in the same vein as regime support or Taiwan 15, its entanglement with national policy and the government’s agenda could implicitly render specific climate-related questions sensitive. The “survey as a test” phenomenon, combined with potential self-censorship under an authoritarian regime, suggests that reported high support for government-led climate policies may reflect compliance or alignment with official narratives more than a genuine, independently formed conviction. This introduces a significant layer of uncertainty regarding the depth and resilience of public support if policies were to become economically burdensome, politically controversial, or if the official narrative were to shift. If the public perceives climate action as a key government priority, expressing support for it becomes the “right answer” to a “test.” This does not negate the support but suggests it might be more superficial or conditional than if it arose from independent, grassroots conviction. The utility of this polling data, therefore, is more about understanding the effectiveness of state messaging and public alignment with official policy, rather than solely gauging independent public will or potential for bottom-up pressure. Non-profits should be cautious about over-interpreting high support percentages as indicative of robust, independent public pressure that could, for instance, challenge government inaction. Instead, they should recognize that public alignment can be a powerful tool for the government to implement its agenda, and non-profits can work within this framework by emphasizing how their initiatives support national goals.

Strategies for Strengthening Polling:

To enhance the reliability and authenticity of climate-related polling in China, several strategies can be employed. Researchers should employ sensitive questioning techniques, such as list experiments or randomized response techniques, to allow respondents to express their true beliefs without fear of repercussions.15 Questions should be carefully framed to avoid appearing as a “test” of loyalty or adherence to official narratives, instead aiming to elicit genuine personal opinions and experiences.15 It is crucial to clearly communicate and genuinely ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of responses. This could involve using secure, independently verified platforms and collaborating with research bodies perceived as trustworthy and independent.15

For more robust climate-related polling, relying solely on online non-probability samples is a significant limitation. Researchers should strive for more representative sampling methods, ideally exploring probability-based sampling frames if feasible, even if challenging.15 A concerted effort must be made to include and adequately represent the opinions of all affected populations, particularly underrepresented groups like ethnic minorities or specific rural communities.13 Researchers conducting climate polling should systematically analyze non-response rates for climate-related questions and consider if certain demographics are less comfortable expressing their views on environmental policies or their implications. Targeted strategies might be needed to engage these groups more effectively.15

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

Public opinion in China demonstrates a remarkably high level of awareness and support for climate change policies and programs, particularly for the nation’s dual carbon targets and the expansion of renewable energy. This broad public acceptance is reinforced by personal experiences of climate impacts and a strong belief in the government’s capacity to deliver on its environmental commitments. The public’s willingness to engage in individual actions and pay more for climate-friendly products also points to an emerging consumer-driven demand for sustainability.

However, the interpretation of these high support levels must be nuanced. The inherent challenges in Chinese public opinion polling, including difficulties in obtaining truly representative samples (especially with the shift to online surveys) and potential self-censorship due to the political environment, suggest that reported figures may represent an upper bound and reflect alignment with official narratives rather than solely independent conviction. Awareness and support also vary significantly across demographic groups, with urban, educated, and higher-income populations generally exhibiting greater engagement.

For climate non-profit organizations operating in or engaging with China, these findings offer several actionable recommendations:

Leverage Alignment with National Goals: Frame initiatives and communications in alignment with China’s stated climate ambitions and the government’s leadership role. Given the public’s strong expectation for government-led action and high trust in official sources, demonstrating how non-profit efforts support national targets (e.g., carbon peaking, carbon neutrality, renewable energy expansion) can enhance legitimacy and public receptiveness.
Tailor Communication to Diverse Demographics: Recognize and address the “awareness gap” among rural, less educated, and lower-income populations. Develop localized, accessible communication materials that connect climate change directly to tangible, immediate concerns such as health, food security, and local environmental quality.
Highlight Co-Benefits of Climate Action: Emphasize the direct, tangible benefits of climate policies and sustainable practices that resonate with daily life, such as improved air quality, healthier living environments (e.g., green buildings), and affordable, technologically advanced solutions (e.g., EVs). This appeals to pragmatic public concerns beyond abstract environmentalism.
Support Market-Based Solutions: Advocate for the strengthening of existing market mechanisms, such as the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), by highlighting strong public support for carbon pricing. This can provide a public mandate for policy reforms that make these mechanisms more effective in driving emissions reductions.
Promote Consumer-Driven Sustainability: Capitalize on the public’s willingness to pay for climate-friendly products and engage in individual actions. Non-profits can facilitate consumer education campaigns, promote green consumption choices, and foster partnerships that bring sustainable products and services to market.
Advocate for Methodological Rigor in Polling: While directly conducting large-scale surveys may be challenging, non-profits can support and advocate for research that employs more robust sampling methodologies and sensitive questioning techniques to gain a more authentic and representative understanding of public opinion, particularly from underrepresented groups. This critical perspective ensures that strategies are based on the most accurate available data.

By understanding the unique dynamics of public opinion in China and adapting strategies accordingly, climate non-profits can play a valuable role in supporting the nation’s climate transition and fostering broader societal engagement.

This Post was submitted by Climate Scorecard China Country Manager Vincent Mao.

Learn More References

1. China – Climate Performance Ranking 2025, accessed August 2, 2025, https://ccpi.org/country/chn/
2. A majority of the public in China, India, the US and around the world support the transition to clean energy, survey findings show – Global Alliance of Universities on Climate, accessed August 2, 2025, https://gauc.net/news/news-247.html
3. Full article: Chinese Public Awareness, Support, and Confidence in China’s Carbon Neutrality Goal – Taylor & Francis Online, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00139157.2024.2395805
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