Context
Five years ago, the Green Party achieved its best-ever performance in the European elections. This marked a turning point in EU politics, amplifying environmental and climate issues on the policy agenda. The European Green Deal was approved in 2019 and designed as the EU’s compass to achieve those objectives. In the years following, considerable progress has been made in delivering the regulatory elements of the Green Deal. Several key laws, including the landmark 2050 Climate Law and the “Fit for 55” package, aim to reduce emissions by 55% by 2030. However, while the EU Green Deal has made significant progress, not all of its ambitious goals have been fully implemented. As work to implement these measures continues, political and economic resistance is mounting, making implementing green initiatives more challenging than ever.
Across Europe, a rising tide of climate scepticism and political shifts is reshaping the landscape. The recent European Parliament elections saw groups that oppose the Green Deal’s ambitious decarbonisation targets gain ground and a loss of 14 seats for the Greens/European Free Alliance, with many of the losses coming from Germany, previously considered a haven for liberal policy[1]. Though Pro-EU groups such as the European People’s Party (EPP), Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe, and the Green/EFA still hold the majority, the growing influence of climate-sceptical parties threatens to undermine the EU’s long-standing pro-climate agenda.
The stakes are higher than ever. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres empathised earlier this year, the battle to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius will be won or lost in the 2020s[2]. We are already witnessing the consequences of delayed climate action, with record heatwaves, floods, and wildfires becoming more frequent. Moreover, recent energy price shocks, while largely geopolitical in origin, have exposed the fragility of public support for green policies—especially when they are perceived as clashing with the cost of living.
In its 2023/2024 transition report, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)[3] found that scepticism of Climate Change and disengagement with Climate Policy were more common in EU member countries than in neighbouring non-members Tunisia, Moldova and Azerbaijan[4],[5]. The concern is that populations already having to deal with trade-offs of green policies present in their lives are already less tolerant of them, underscoring growing resistance to the climate agenda. If we fail to maintain broad political and public backing, the ambitious climate policies initiated in the early 2020s may fall short at the very moment when swift, decisive action is needed to avert the worst outcomes of climate change.
What is driving the rejection of climate policy
Reasons for rejecting climate policies range from deep-seated anti-environmentalism to more common frustrations about cost and the fact that the transition is not managed fairly or transparently. Age has traditionally been a predictor of climate scepticism. Still, in a concerning shift, younger voters increasingly turn to far-right parties, challenging the assumption that youth will always back green policies.
One key factor may be the widening urban-rural divide, where disparities in service provision, education, and employment opportunities are widening the skills gap between rural and urban populations, which, if left unchecked, can lead to pools of simmering discontent in the affected populations[6]. This discontent has been exacerbated by the growing cost-of-living crisis and inflation driven by the invasion of Ukraine. Such feelings of disenfranchisement, when left ignored, can give rise to civil unrest, as seen by the 2018 Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) protests in France and the earlier 2011 Movimento dei Forconi (Pitchfork Movement) in Italy, both sparked by rising fuel prices, which were felt were particularly harsh on rural workers and small businesses, and a sense of being ignored by the government.
A recent analysis of the European Social Survey (ESS)[7] found that while Climate Change awareness is strongly influenced by individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics, values, and political orientation, in contrast, Climate Change denial is more strongly influenced by an individual’s worldview and detachment from mainstream society[8]. Right-wing populist narratives capitalise on this detachment, and in recent years, climate change denial has resurged in countries such as Italy and Germany, tied to climate disinformation campaigns and the rise of far-right political groups.
Climate disinformation campaigns are a significant challenge facing the EU. These campaigns use various tactics to undermine the mainstream establishment, promoting mistrust and disenfranchisement while sowing doubt about the urgency of climate change and the need for immediate policy responses.
Key types of misinformation include:
- Climate denial: Reviving outdated arguments, such as pointing to colder weather periods to claim global warming is a hoax, undermines scientific consensus. This type of denial is featured in major media outlets and can influence public opinion.
- Greenwashing: Industries, particularly fossil fuel companies, falsely present themselves as environmentally responsible to avoid regulation. They claim to make sufficient voluntary changes, downplaying the need for strong policy measures.
- Delaying or obstructing action: Campaigns argue that climate policies are elitist, undemocratic, and disconnected from ordinary citizens’ concerns. These narratives claim that green policies will disrupt national economies, increase costs for people with low incomes, and disproportionately affect lower-income or rural populations[9].
In addition to right-wing political groups, the fossil fuel industries, conservative think tanks, and foreign influences like Russia have been found to engage in some form of climate disinformation campaign that seeks to delay or obstruct climate action.
State Actors: There is growing evidence that Russia has been involved in disinformation campaigns targeting EU climate policy[10]. As one of the world’s largest fossil fuel exporters, Russia is vested in undermining Europe’s efforts to reduce reliance on oil and gas, particularly as the EU seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies. Russia has promoted disinformation that portrays renewable energy as unreliable or overly expensive, successfully fostering doubt about the EU’s energy transition to encourage continued reliance on Russian gas. By amplifying both anti-environmental and far-right messages (such as exaggerating the potential job losses or poverty caused by climate action), Russia has sought to polarise public opinion and disrupt political cohesion around climate policies, efforts considered to be part of a broader strategy designed to undermine the EU’s unity and democracy[11].
Fossil fuel industry: Similar to the tactics deployed by fossil fuel companies in the United States, some European fossil fuel companies or their affiliates have funded or supported lobbying campaigns through lobbying groups like Fuelling Europe’s Future and the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP). These groups seek to delay the EU’s transition to renewable energy, weaken emissions reduction targets[12], reduce measures designed to reduce household bills, and tax windfall profits during the energy crisis[13],[14].
Anti-environmental or libertarian think tanks: Several think tanks and lobby groups are linked to political parties across Europe and the US, which have historically opposed climate action. They have framed it as government overreach or a threat to individual freedoms and economic prosperity. These groups typically downplay climate risks, promoting “climate delay” narratives, which acknowledge Climate Change but argue against the need for rapid or large-scale interventions[15].
- European Institute for Climate and Energy (EIKE) (Germany)[16]: EIKE is a climate-sceptic organisation based in Germany that actively promotes denialist and delay narratives. It regularly publishes content questioning the validity of climate science, portraying climate policies as excessive, and warning about the economic impact of decarbonisation. EIKE has often partnered with U.S.-based groups like the Heartland Institute and the German right-wing party Alternative fur Deutschland AfD and the heartland institute[17]
- Institut für Unternehmerische Freiheit (IUF) (Germany): The IUF is another German libertarian think tank close to EIKE[18]. IUF promotes free-market solutions and opposes government regulations, particularly environmental ones.
- Institut Économique Molinari (IEM)(Franc): The IEM is a French think tank that promotes libertarian economic policies and is critical of large-scale climate interventions. It argues that excessive regulation on carbon emissions and renewable energy targets stifle economic freedom and hinder growth[19].
Right-wing populist parties are both benefactors and beneficiaries of the growing sense of disenfranchisement across Europe. They skillfully exploit this feeling by promoting climate denial as a compelling narrative, framing it as a rejection of the “elite” agendas behind costly climate initiatives, fuelling distrust in science, mainstream politics, and the media. The National Rally in France, Lega in Italy, Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) also use delaying and obstructive tactics, taking a clear stance against climate policies and the renewable energy transition. They argue that climate policies disrupt national economies by reducing business competitiveness and deindustrialising the block while making life more expensive for normal citizens[20]. In their 2024 EU election manifesto, PVV states, “While EU bureaucrats are keeping warm with their generous salaries, Dutch people are out in the cold because of the unaffordable energy bill.” This is a compelling argument for many who are increasingly faced with the imperative of putting food on the tale. Such campaigns have already swayed voters to shift behind populist parties in recent national elections and started to shape policy decisions at regional and national levels.
What is the effect
This politicisation of Climate Change has heightened scepticism, as many feel that European governments and EU institutions have favoured top-down measures that seem disconnected from local concerns and anger that the transition is not being managed fairly or transparently[21]. The perception that climate-related decisions are made in confusing, opaque processes, often behind closed doors and without local input, amplifies this sentiment. In December 2022, the Council of the European Union invoked an emergency legal clause to fast-track the deployment of 22 energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies like heat pumps and solar. While aimed at accelerating climate action, this measure undermined established EU environmental and public consultation rules, intensifying the sense of exclusion felt by local communities.
At the national government level, we have seen a stark shift in the political balance; since 2020, far-right parties have entered into government in Italy, Finland and Greece, joining Hungry, Finland and Austria, with growing influence in Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. This shift has helped to stall or derail the deployment of climate initiatives. A notable example occurred in 2023, when Italy’s government, led by Giorgia Meloni, reallocated EUR 16 billion that had been that had been designated for green projects from the Next Generation EU National Recovery and Resilience Plan[22]. In collaboration with other parties in Germany, the AfD has successfully voted against wind power expansion in the East German States or clean mobility plans at the regional and local levels. In regions like Saxony and Brandenburg, the party has worked to halt the expansion of wind farms, leveraging local concerns about wind turbines’ visual and environmental impacts on rural areas[23].
Perhaps more concerning is the effect of the far-right rise on the decisions of the centrist governments. By gaining electoral support and influencing political debates, far-right parties have widened the ideological spectrum on the right, pulling the political centre with it and essentially re-establishing the political equilibrium. In Spain, to secure power, the mainstream liberal-conservative Popular Party (PP) entered into coalitions with the country’s leading far-right party, Vox, at regional and local levels. Criticism was made that this has led to budget cuts for climate change mitigation, eliminated low-emission zones in urban areas and removed planned bike lanes and equally in the European People’s Party faced criticism of anti-green campaign rhetoric in the run-up to this year’s elections, which may be challenging to shift, once established[24]. In Poland, Donald Tusks recently elected government, facing a fragile balance among his populace, distanced itself from some of the EU’s ambitious climate targets, including the EU Nature Restoration Law. Additionally, his administration rolled back the previous government’s plans for a tax on polluting cars, a measure designed to curb emissions from the transport sector.
Strategies to Address Opposition
The EU’s challenges are systemic and spread well beyond the climate agenda. For climate reforms to succeed, they need a broad public support base that seems to be waning. It may be tempting to trivialise their concerns as either a result of manipulation or as insignificant compared to the overwhelming scale of the threat of Climate Change. However, neglecting the needs of those affected by the transition would be a mistake. In an article with Reuters, the Chief Economist of the EBRD stated while talking about the lessons learned from their work in transition economies, “If you do not take care of people who lose as a result of the shock, there will be a backlash”[25]. Evidence would suggest that we are now witnessing that backlash, and how it evolves will be determined by the measures taken by Europe’s leaders.
Addressing disinformation: While it is easy to criticise actions that do not align with one’s political agenda, it is crucial to respect the democratic process and the accountability mechanisms that hold decision-makers accountable. Disinformation threatens the Green Deal and undermines democracy by distorting public discourse and obstructing transparent decision-making.
The EU is increasingly aware of the threat posed by climate disinformation and has taken several steps to combat it, including raising awareness and developing policy, resources, and tool kits designed to support different groups[26]. However, the scale of the challenge is enormous, and more still needs to be done.
Prioritise a just transition: The most urgent task for the EU is to ensure that climate policies are fair and inclusive. While long-term goals like job creation in green sectors are vital, the immediate focus should be protecting those hardest hit during the transition. The Just Transition Mechanism[27] is a central part of the Green Deal. It is designed to support the populations most affected by the transition from fossil fuels in coal-dependent areas and provide financial support for economic diversification, infrastructure investment, social services, skills development and job retraining. It aims to help workers in carbon-intensive industries transition to new roles in sectors like renewable energy and clean technology.
Focus on tangible, immediate benefits: Shift the focus to the near-term benefits of climate action. Emphasise the benefits of cost-reducing technologies like heat pumps, home insulation and energy-efficient appliances that can immediately lower household bills. The EU’s Social Carbon Fund provides subsidies for vulnerable households to adopt energy-efficient technologies, such as heat pumps, which are critical for reducing energy costs and emissions. The fund will also offer temporary income support to households affected by rising energy costs due to the expansion of the ETS and funding for building renovations and other energy efficiency measures.
Ensuring greater participation: Participation in climate policy development is essential for generating effective and equitable climate policy. The EU has developed multiple mechanisms to ensure local communities and stakeholders actively engage in its policymaking and implementation processes. These efforts aim to involve local actors in key areas such as regional development, climate action, urban planning, and rural innovation. For example, the Partnership Principle is a cornerstone of the EU’s Cohesion Policy. It ensures that local, regional, and national authorities, along with social partners, civil society organisations, and businesses, are actively involved in the planning, implementing, and evaluating projects funded by the EU. The European Committee of the Regions (COR) is the EU’s regional and local representatives assembly, providing a direct channel for local governments to influence EU legislation and policy.
Addressing Inequality: Inequality lies at the heart of the anti-climate policy agenda, fueling the belief that climate initiatives are unfair. The EU is making concerted efforts to reduce inequality through various policies and programs to improve access to education, jobs, and social services and address regional and gender disparities. However, challenges remain, particularly in ensuring that the most disadvantaged groups and regions can access these supports effectively. To fully address inequality, the EU must continue expanding these programs and ensure they are implemented equitably across all member states.
Rightly or wrongly, the era of the moral obligation to take action on climate change may be over. If the EU’s Climate Objectives and Energy Transition are to be realised, they must be accompanied by supportive policies designed to ease the burden of the poorest families. This involves tracking challenges of rising inequality to ensure that the bulk of the climate burden does not fall on the shoulders of those least equipped to bear it.
While the Just Transition Mechanism EU aims to ensure that the green transition is not only environmentally sustainable but also socially just, criticism remains that the Just Transition coverage is incomplete and not sufficient for the huge task of addressing the social challenges ahead on the way to achieving a net-zero carbon economy[28].
This environment of misinformation and heightened scrutiny shortfall in providing a fair and just transition risks undermining the substantial progress already made. Without broad public support and comprehensive social protections, delays or derailment of the EU’s climate goals are real threats. Therefore, achieving climate resilience and social justice is crucial to maintaining momentum and ensuring the transition is environmentally effective, socially fair, and politically sustainable.
This Post was submitted by Climate Scorecard European Union Manager George Scott.
[1] Right wing and conservative groups: Patriots for Europe (PfE) plus 10 seats; The European Conservative and Reformists Group (ECR) plus 16 seats, the Europe of Sovereign Nations Group plus 25 seats; Centrist and liberal groups: European People’s Party Group (EEP) plus 1 seat, Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) minus 12 seats, Renew Europe minus 20 seats, the Greens/European Free Alliance minus 14 seats.
[2] https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2024-06-05/secretary-generals-special-address-climate-action-moment-of-truth%C2%A0
[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/green-scepticism-greater-eu-than-neighbours-ebrd-finds-2024-03-05/
[4] https://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/transition-report/transition-report-202324.html
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/green-scepticism-greater-eu-than-neighbours-ebrd-finds-2024-03-05/
[6] https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/blog/2023/europes-widening-rural-urban-divide-may-make-space-far-right
[7] The European Social Survey (ESS) is a cross-national survey that measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of the European population
[8] Fraembs, T.V., Drobnič, S. Ill-informed or ideologically driven? Climate change awareness and denial in Europe. Popul Environ 46, 21 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-024-00462-7
[9] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/article/2024/aug/08/fossil-fuel-industry-using-disinformation-campaign-to-slow-green-transition-says-un#:~:text=Fossil%20fuel%20companies%20are%20running,economy%2C%20the%20UN%20has%20said.
[10] https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/7/pdf/240709-Climate-Security-Impact.pdf
[11] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17323/meps-condemn-continuous-russian-efforts-to-undermine-european-democracy
[12] https://transparency.eu/transparency-international-eu-and-the-fossil-free-politics-campaign-demand-tighter-lobbying-rules-after-investigation-reveals-alarming-level-of-fossil-fuel-industry-access-to-european-commission/
[13] https://corporateeurope.org/en/2023/10/fossil-fuel-lobbyists-undermining-energy-crisis-measures-across-europe
[14] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/10/30/windfall-taxes-on-european-energy-companies-weakened-by-intense-lobbying-says-new-study
[15] Almiron, N., Boykoff, M., Narberhaus, M. et al. Dominant counter-frames in influential climate contrarian European think tanks. Climatic Change 162, 2003–2020 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02820-4
[16] Moreno, Jose & Kinn, Mira & Narberhaus, Marta. (2022). A stronghold of climate change denialism in Germany: Case study of the output and press representation of the think tank EIKE. International Journal of Communication. 16. 267-288.
[17] https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/afd-seeks-votes-by-opposing-climate-protection-a-1265494.html
[18] https://onthinktanks.org/think-tank/institut-fur-unternehmerische-freiheit/
[19] Almiron, N., Boykoff, M., Narberhaus, M. et al. Dominant counter-frames in influential climate contrarian European think tanks. Climatic Change 162, 2003–2020 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02820-4
[20] https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italys-meloni-vows-to-revise-disastrous-eu-green-deal/
[21] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/is-there-a-silver-lining-to-europes-climate-change-turmoil?lang=en¢er=europe
[22] https://www.ft.com/content/120c85d7-aa60-4750-a383-67adb08bbcce
[23] https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-and-climate-change-what-are-the-parties-pledges/a-59285491
[24] https://www.politico.eu/article/teresa-ribera-climate-change-europe-conservatives-fueling-far-right-green-deal-crusade/
[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/green-scepticism-greater-eu-than-neighbours-ebrd-finds-2024-03-05/
[26] https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-disinformation_en#:~:text=It%20can%20take%20many%20forms,therefore%20requires%20no%20urgent%20action.
[27] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism_en
[28] https://www.etui.org/publications/why-eus-patchy-just-transition-framework-not-meeting-its-climate-ambitions